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Two Approaches to Internationalizing the
Curriculum: Some Comments
Mathias W. Reimann*
One might say that there are two basic approaches to
internationalizing the first year curriculum: one may be called the
integration model, the other the separation model. Both have advantages
and disadvantages.
The first approach introduces a "global" perspective in the first-year
curriculum by presenting occasional comparative, international or
transnational perspectives in all (or at least most of) the courses in a
piecemeal fashion. This forces (first-year) law students to become
conscious of the legal world beyond the domestic orbit. In a sense, this
is an ideal approach because it teaches them to think beyond U.S.-
boundaries at the most formative stage of their legal education, i.e., at a
time when they can easily learn to accept foreign and international law as
a normal part of their professional toolkit. The problem is that this
approach is relatively difficult to implement. In order to pursue it in an
organized fashion, the whole first-year faculty must be on board, and that
tends to be a relatively large and heterogeneous group. At least some of
its members will have no particular interest in, not to mention knowledge
of, global perspectives and will thus cooperate at best reluctantly. Unless
the dean is strong (or outright overbearing), keeping this group together
can be like herding cats and requires constant vigilance against open or
clandestine defection. This approach also requires a set of materials
which present comparative or international perspectives in up to half-a-
dozen different contexts. These materials need to be coordinated in order
to avoid redundancies and, ideally, to provide a variety of
complementary perspectives. At least in this regard, the start-up costs
are high. Finally, such an approach inevitably remains fragmentary in
the sense that it does not convey any coherent picture-neither of foreign
legal systems and cultures nor of the international order. Students learn a
little bit of this and little bit of that and, arguably, nothing in any depth or
* Mathias Reimann, Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan;
Dr. iur. University of Freiburg (Germany) 1982; LL.M. University of Michigan (1983).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
breadth. Still, as a consciousness-raising enterprise, it can be a very
effective way to show students how comparative and international
perspectives can matter in virtually every context, particularly where
students would never have expected them to come into play.
The second approach, which we have pursued at Michigan, is to
create a separate introductory course which provides an overview of the
world legal order, and then to make such a course mandatory. This
allows the students to see the larger picture, to recognize connections,
patterns, and general features of transnational law. It is easier to
implement because it counts only on the international component of the
faculty which has more expertise and can be expected to engage with
conviction, if not enthusiasm, in such an enterprise. In other words, it
makes it relatively simple to round up the usual suspects. Fewer players
also ensure fewer coordination problems, and once the course is
instituted, it can run almost on auto-pilot (as it does now at Michigan).
In addition, it requires only one set of teaching materials, and once they
are created, they can be used by all teachers and over long periods of
time, provided they are updated at regular intervals. Yet, this model has
two major downsides. First, it separates the comparative and
international materials from the rest of the course-work; to be sure, there
will be plenty of interplay with domestic and foreign or international
legal materials and issues, but global perspectives still appear in a
separate course, i.e., outside the more standard topics. Second, it is
difficult to avoid sliding into teaching simply a watered-down version of
the traditional (public) international law course. As a result, one must
make every effort to include private international and comparative law
materials. After all, most of our graduates do not work for the State
Department but in private practice. They need basic knowledge not
about treaty making, the UN Security Council or the laws of war and
peace but about international business transactions, litigation, and trade.
The two models also differ as to when they best fit into the
curriculum. The integration model is ideally suited for the first year
although it need not be limited to it. Upper-class courses can (and
should) also contain comparative and international perspectives, and in
some areas, such as corporations, antitrust, or intellectual property,
limiting the syllabus strictly to domestic materials borders on educational
malpractice under modem conditions. Still, students best absorb
comparative and international law thinking when they are fully engaged
in learning the ropes in the traditional subject matter areas of the first
year-discussing procedural regimes without civil juries makes the
greatest impression when the American jury is under consideration, and
international human rights come into sharpest relief when compared to
the Bill of Rights jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. The
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separation model, however, is not necessarily best realized in the first
year. At Michigan, the course is mandatory but can be taken any time
before graduation. After more than five years of experience with it, we
tend to think that students may be better off to take it in the first semester
of their second year. This is mainly because learning about the world
legal order is easier, and makes more sense, on the basis of a somewhat
deeper understanding of one's own legal system. Even here, the learning
experience is (inevitably) comparative but it is so in a much broader
fashion, e.g., by comparing the domestic legal order to the international
one, a treaty to a statute, or the role of judicial decisions in international
versus domestic law, and first-year students mostly lack sufficient
background knowledge and understanding effectively to make such
broad comparisons. In addition, first-year students already have their
hands (and heads) full with the traditional courses, and forcing them to
keep yet another ball in the air runs the risk that they will drop it. Thus,
we now encourage students to take the mandatory Transnational Law
course after the first year unless they have some background in
international studies or are sure that they want to make comparative and
international law the main focus of their legal education. Currently,
about half of our students take the course as their first-year elective, the
other half enroll in it later. Of course, one problem with that situation is
the challenge of teaching the course to a mixture of first-year and upper-
class students with different levels of sophistication and background
knowledge.
In pursuing either model, we must be sensitive to the students'
capacity to absorb new material. The first year is certainly very full as it
is and adding comparative and international perspectives becomes
counterproductive if students experience it as an unreasonable burden.
In a similar fashion, adding a mandatory course entails the risk that they
feel overwhelmed and thus resentful. It is true that we can sell global
perspectives to today's students more easily than in the past and that we
should do so openly and with conviction but we should make every effort
to minimize the cost. Plainly, something has to give, be it the traditional
coverage of the first-year courses or the freedom of choice in the upper-
class curriculum. We must also never forget that, at least for the time
being, our primary responsibility is to train American lawyers in
American law. Comparative and international perspectives are a
necessary ingredient in today's legal education but they should not take
center-stage and push domestic law to the margin. The (domestic as well
as foreign) market still mostly requires American lawyers with a global
understanding rather than global lawyers with some American law
background.
While the choice between the two models mentioned (or hybrids or
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
other alternatives, like the Georgetown "Week One" approach) must be
well-considered, it is ultimately of secondary importance. The most
important thing is to take action. After many AALS meetings in the last
decade, at which we have discussed these matters ad nauseam, we must
actually do something in the classroom. Fortunately, actual progress is
finally being made as at least a handful of law schools are adding
mandatory global perspectives to their curriculum, and there is reason to
believe that others will soon follow their lead.
Let me add one final consideration. I often hear from colleagues
that they feel too unsure of their own expertise and skill to plunge into
foreign or international law. This is understandable, and I do not want to
belittle such concerns. Yet, doubts about one's own proper training and
arguments against superficiality often ring hollow and sound like mere
excuses. Let us admit it: we rarely have scruples of that sort in other
contexts. Torts professors dabble in economic analysis of law without a
Ph.D. in economics and discuss efficiency goals merely on the basis of
having read some Calabresi and Posner; constitutional law teachers wax
eloquent on political theories which they rarely understand more than
superficially; and criminal law instructors discuss problems of moral
responsibility without any erudition in moral philosophy. To be sure,
comparative and international law are full of pitfalls, but they are not
rocket science, and with a little help from their foreign-trained and
internationally-oriented friends on the faculty (and elsewhere), most
academic teachers will be able to do a reasonably good job. A professor
must, of course, be honest about his or her limits but often the best
teaching results from exploring new terrain jointly with the students.
Here, as elsewhere, he or she will learn from experience, and that
includes from mistakes, both one's own and those of others. Nor is it an
excuse for inertia that we want to avoid merely superficial understanding
on the part of our students. It is true, of course, that a little knowledge is
dangerous thing but it is even more true that complete ignorance is
worse.
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